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FOREWORD 
Low fertility levels in many countries are creating aging 
populations whose demands for health care and income maintenance 
(social security) will increase to unprecedented levels, thereby 
calling forth policies that will promote increased family care 
and worklife flexibility. The Population Program at IIASA is 
examining current patterns of population aging and changing 
life-styles, projecting the needs for health and income support 
that such patterns are likely to generate during the next several 
decades, and considering alternative family and employment poli- 
cies thatmight reduce the social costs of meeting these needs. 
The program is seeking to develop a better understanding 
of how fertility and mortality combine to create aging popula- 
tions, with high demands for health and income maintenance, and 
reduced family support systems that can provide that maintenance. 
The research will produce analyses of current demographic pat- 
terns, primarily in IIASA countries, together with an assess- 
ment of their probable future societal consequences and impacts 
on the aging. It will consider the position of the elderly 
within changing family structures, review national policies 
that promote an enlarged role for family care, and examine the 
costs and benefits of alternative systems for encouraging work- 
life flexibility by transferring income between different periods 
of life. 
This paper cansiders age effects in production and in con- 
sumption. In it Nathan Keyfitz argues that whereas experience 
may be an asset to the individual and the economy under condi- 
tions of fixed technology, with rapid technical change it can be 
a handicap to both. He goes on to consider the redistribution of 
consumption, and to examine social security in the framework of 
intergenerational transfers. On this topic Keyfitz concludes 
that the current difficulties with the financing of social secu- 
rity in the United States and elsewhere arise largely out of the 
fact that the public was led to expect more benefit from social 
security than it was capable of providing. By exaggerating the 
promises of what it could provide and understating the true 
costs of these benefits, the sponsors of such systems contri- 
buted to the current crisis in financing. 
Related publications are listed at the end of the paper. 
Andrei Rogers 
Leader 
Population Program 
ABSTRACT 
The consequences o f  t h e  e x t e n s i v e  changes i n  a g e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
now o c c u r r i n g  i n  developed c o u n t r i e s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
whether  one c o n s i d e r s  a s p e c t s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o r  consumption.  Too 
l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  has  been g iven  t o  t h e  fo rmer ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  re- 
l a t i o n  t o  t h e  pace  o f  t e c h n i c a l  change.  Th i s  p a p e r  opens up t h a t  
s u b j e c t .  Under f i x e d  t e c h n o l o g y ,  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  an a s s e t  t o  t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  and t o  t h e  economy; under  r a p i d  change,  e x p e r i e n c e  can  
b e  a  h a n d i c a p  t o  b o t h .  I t  i s  a l s o  shown how fewer  e n t r a n t s  i n t o  
t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  makes f o r  h i g h e r  s t a r t i n g  wages b u t  s lower  promo- 
t i o n  t o  more r e s p o n s i b l e  work. 
Of t h e  v a r i o u s  consumption and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s p e c t s ,  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  i s  t h e  most consp icuous .  An e a r l i e r  paper  ( K e y f i t z ,  1 9 8 1 )  
developed fo rmulas  f o r  t h e  i m p l i c i t  r e s e r v e  of  a  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
scheme; h e r e  w e  c a r r y  t h e s e  f u r t h e r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  
w e a l t h .  The cr i s i s  i n  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
schemes have been  p r i c e d  lower  t h a n  s h e e r  a r i t h m e t i c  shows t o  be  
t h e i r  long- term c o s t .  Because t h e  p u b l i c  b e l i e v e d  t h e  c o s t s  t o  
be lower  t h a n  it now r e a l i z e s  t h e y  a r e ,  it bought  a  l a r g e r  quan- 
t i t y  t h a n  it r e a l l y  wanted.  Y e t  it i s  r e l u c t a n t  t o  r educe  t h e  
q u a n t i t y  -- by r a i s i n g  t h e  r e t i r e m e n t  age  o r  l c w e r i n g  t h e  r e p l a c e -  
ment r a t i o  -- because  t h e  scheme seems s o  f r a g i l e  t h a t  any tamper- 
i n g  w i t h  it  c o u l d  b e  t h e  opening wedge t o  t o t a l  d i s m a n t l i n g .  W e  
l o c a t e  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  i n  t h e  framework of  i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a n s -  
f e r s ,  whose problems a r i s e  a s  a  d i r e c t  consequence o f  b i r t h  f l u c -  
t u a t i o n s .  L i n e s  o f  argument converge  t o  show t h a t  t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  
of t h e  g e n e r a t i o n s  i s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  by a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l  fund ing  o f  
s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y .  
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AGE EFFECTS IN WORK AND CONSUMPTION 
Nathan Key? t z  
We know that one can read the population history of a country from its age 
distribution; the wars, epidemics, rise and fall of fertility of at  least the last 70 
years are plainly imprinted on the population pyramid. We know also that a fast 
growing population will take the form of a' squat triangle, while a stationary 
population with modern low mortality will have almost equal numbers of people 
a t  ages up to 60 or so. However it is arranged, the care of the young is more 
difficult for the growing population by virtue of the high ratio of chldren to 
adults, and the care of the old is easier because the ratio of those of retired 
age is small in relation to ,those working. Low mortality is responsible for 
some of the large relative number of retired in contemporary populations, but 
a much more important factor is the low birth rate. These and similar state- 
ments have been disseminated widely in journals and the press of industrial 
countries during the past few years. Some of their consequences for social 
security financing in IIASA countries were taken up in an earlier working paper 
(Keyfitz, 1981) that treated the distinction between funded and pay-as-you-go 
schemes. That material is not repeated here. 
The present paper reaches further in attempting to measure some of the 
effects quantitatively, and then goes on to point out other features of age &stri- 
bution that have not yet appeared in the standard literature. More important, 
it makes a distinction between the age incidence of consumption, including its 
redistribution through social programs, on the one hand, and the effect of age 
distribution on production on the other hand. Some of what follows is far 
enough off the beaten path that at  t h s  stage it must be regarded as conjecture 
This paper was written at the hternational hstitute for Applied Systems Research (IIASA) in 
Laxenburg, Austria. I am grateful for the facilities provided by IIASA, and absolve it of any 
reaponsibility for the errors in the paper. 
rather than assertion. We start with the production side, and consider in partic- 
ular the relatively large number of entrants into the labor force 20 years after 
the baby boom in Europe and even more in America, and the subsequent 
decline of entrants. 
PART I. THE INCIDENCE OF AGE ON PRODUCTION 
Table 1 shows the age distribution of the United States in 1982 and pro- 
jected to 1992. The peak age, 20-24, corresponding to births of 1957-62, is more 
than one third higher than 5-9, corresponding to births of 1972-77. The extraor- 
dinary compression of the pyramid at  ages under 20 is typical of other 
developed countries in wake of the baby boom; most European countries show 
the effect in less accentuated form, whle Japan shows it even more sharply. 
The official projection to 1992 foresees a drop of 16 per cent in ages 15-24 
over the decade, amounting to a fall in entrants into the labor force of about 1.8 
per cent per year. For ages 15-29 taken as a whole the drop is 12 per cent. 
Table 2 gives single years of age and shows a drop over the decade of 2 1/2 per 
cent per year among the 18 and 19 year olds. 
Great importance has been attributed to the aging of the labor force as 
the baby boom recedes, and some spectacular positive effects are foreseen. A 
publication of the Rand Corporation (Butz et  al., 1982) said not only that their 
small numbers augur well for the currently entering cohorts, but that the pros- 
perity that these attain will spread to the economy, and good times are ahead 
for all. This carries to an extreme the thesis of Richard Easterlin (1980), 
whereby a small cohort is advantaged, a large one suffers, that has been the 
most convincing explanation of the baby boom (its parents being the small 
cohorts of the 1930s) so far offered. Others draw optimistic conclusions from 
ageing on the grounds that more experience results in higher productivity, and 
they even measure the productivity increase with apparent exactitude by the 
Table 1. Age d i s t r ibu t ion  fo r  1982 and 1 9 9 2 ,  according t o  
var ian t  I1 of t h e  USBC 1977  projection.  
. .-- .  THOUSANDS - Age ac lasr: 
birthdav 
Total 
0-4 
5- 9 
10-14 
15-19 
20- 24 
25-29 
3G34 
35-39 
4G44 
45-49 
5G54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
70- 74 
75-79 
80- 84 
85+ 
Total 
Average annual 
increase ( % I  
rise in average pay with age. 
It is striking, then, that the Japanese press has been Alled with foreboding 
regarding the same phenomenon-aging of the population--that causes euphoria 
in the United States. Japan had very large numbers of entrants into the labor 
force ten years ago, and its birth rate declined even more sharply than those 
of western countries in the 1970s, so that its prospective entering cohorts will 
Table 2. Single years of age for 1982, 1992, for the United 
Sates, showing absolute amount of increase and 
rate of increase in percent. 
THOUSANDS OF PERSONS 
Average annual 
Age 1982 1992 Increase increase ( % )  
15 3593 3250 -343 -1.00 
16 3661 3160 -501 -1.47 
17 3888 3222 -666 -1.88 
18 408 7 3168 -919 -2.55 
19 4185 3274 -911 -2.45 
Source: USBC 1977 Projection. 
be very small. Small numbers of entrants, an aging labor force, and increas- 
ing numbers past working age is a combination common to the United States, 
Western Europe and Japan; why the Japanese should worry about it while we 
base our hopes of prosperity on it needs examination. 
Clearly small entering cohorts will encounter a strong demand for their 
labor, and their wages will be hlgher than if they were larger. It is said that 
they will be promoted more rapidly-by this author (Keyfitz, 1977) and others. 
We will see how that assertion is subject to some serious qualiflcations. But 
first we look into the argument frequently used that an aging labor force is 
good for the economy because older workers are more productive. If wages 
are set at marginal productivity then that must be true. 
The age gradient of wages 
It must be even more true of Japan than of the United States, for in Japan 
the wages of employees rise more sharply with age than they do in Europe and 
America. Whereas men about age 52 in the United States (1970 data from the 
USBC, Current Population Reports, Series p-60 No 80, 1971, cited by 'lee Rainwa- 
ter, 1974, p. 161) were on the average paid less than 2.5 times men aged 22, in 
Japan the ratio seems to be between 3 and 4. Does t h s  mean that men 
increase more rapidly in effectiveness with age in Japan than they do in the 
United States? 
Few would assert that national differences lie in the gradient of produc- 
tivity with age; most would say that the countries differ rather in the stability 
of employment in the firm, in the respect given to age, and in the conventions 
concerning pay raises. Whatever the causes of the steeper gradient of pay 
with age in Japan, there can be no doubt of the disruptive effect of ageing on 
patterns of employment and of profit. For the custom has been to replace 
employees as early as 55 with younger ones that do similar work at a fraction 
of the salary. If the younger ones are not to be had, so that the old high 
cost workers have to be retained, the effect on profits can be disastrous. 
While the steeper gradient of pay with age may partly explain the different 
analyses of ageing in the two countries, yet the gradient even in western coun- 
tries is probably higher than corresponds to productivity. There are conven- 
tions among us, especially in white collar work, whereby the employee's pay 
goes up year by year, without any very close consideration of whether he has 
become more productive. As the labor force shifts from manufacturing occu- 
pations (often paid by the piece, and therefore by defhition with a gradient 
equal to that of productivity) to whte collar work the weight of convention in 
fixing remuneration in the economy increases. The assessment of productivity 
in most white collar tasks is difficult, and this difficulty encourages the play of 
convention in setting salaries higher for older people. The result is bound 
everywhere to make aging a disadvantage for the firm, though the degree of 
disadvantage will vary with the strength of the convention that people who have 
been in the f r m  longer ought to be paid more, and with the stability of employ- 
ment. 
Ths does not suspend the laws of economics. Young people choosing 
employers, and noting the low starting wages, will choose partly on the basis 
of which offers the better prospective lifetime wage Competition will force life- 
time wages to some degree of correspondence with lifetime productivity. 
Sooner or later there will be adjustment to the aging labor force but the 
adjust'ment process could take more than a generation and be far too slow to 
avoid bankruptcies caused by soaring labor costs. 
The main question of the first part of t h s  paper is under what condition 
does the productivity of the individual increase with age and experience. We 
shall argue that the pace of technical change is fundamental to  answering this 
question. 
The value of experience under technical change 
Under a fixed technology the experience of the worker is bound to cumu- 
late, and there must be few occupations in which he does not get more and 
more skilled, up to some advanced age that corresponds to physical 
deterioration. Improved skill pays off not only for the worker but for the 
economy to which he contributes h s  services. The tool-and-die maker could 
be the prince of craftsmen because he could accumulate experience, perhaps 
up to the very day that he retired. 
But if technical change is rapid then economic advance depends on some- 
thing very different from the experience of the labor force in place; it 
depends on the speed with whch those in place can either change themselves 
(even requiring that they forget thew old skills as they learn new ones) or else 
be succeeded by a new generation of workers. With numerical control of 
machine tools existing workers have to learn very different skills, or else give 
over to younger people. The changeover to automatic composition in the 
world's newspapers, ultimately inevitable if only to eliminate typesetters' 
errors, would take place sooner if there were fewer skilled typesetters previ- 
ously employed, and if each had not invested so many years in acquiring a 
specific skill. In an epoch of rapid change advance depends not on the cumula- 
tion of experience, but on its discarding and replacement. 
Wth a given pace of technical advance and less than lifetime employment in 
the same firm competition would drive the age gradient of salary to some degree 
of conformity with the age gradient of productivity. Especially if the pace of 
technical advance has been slow, the employee of 52 may indeed be worth 2.5 
times as much as the employee of 22. But what happens to this equilibrium if 
the technology speeds up? Then even with a fixed age distribution the pay gra- 
dient becomes inappropriate and a fortiori with a rising average age. 
But what happens to t h s  equilibrium if the technology speeds up? Then 
even with a fixed age distribution the pay gradient becomes inappropriate. 
The bearing of this point on the advantage or disadvantage of an older 
labor force is clear enough. Unfortunately its application requires some 
knowledge, or at least surmise, on the prospects of technical change in the 
future, as well as on the skill requirements of new technology. Just as manufac- 
turing productivity took a jump in the 1930s, and agricultural in the 1950s, so it 
looks as though office productivity is having its turn in the 1980s. With the 
majority of the labor force now in white collar (essentially information process- 
ing) work the spread of computers will rapidly change the distribution of skills 
needed in the economy as a whole. 
While generalization is difficult, one can say broadly that new techniques 
tend to require less specific skills, but more general competence and adapta- 
bility. Not the skill of the artisan cabinet maker who has worked over the 
same bench for half his life, skill that is entirely useless for activities other 
than cabinet making, but the kind of h g h  school or college education by which 
the person could use a word processor this year, be a programmer next, 
manage a print shop the year after that. The tendency of our system of upbr- 
inging, including more schooling and delayed entrance into the labor force for 
youth, makes young people more adaptable than their elders, even at the start 
of their working life. That is one of the reasons why having fewer young people 
cannot be an advantage for the economy. 
Substitutability among ages 
Any assertion on the effect of changing age distribution depends on the 
facts regarding the substitutability of persons of various ages in production. If it 
were the case that age was entirely indifferent to the employer and entirely 
unrelated to productivity, then no alteration of age distribution would have any 
significance; the only demographcs that would count would be the number of 
persons in the labor force and their occupational distribution. This condition 
rarely applies, but the opposite extreme, complete determination by age, 
appears equally unlikely. Though there are few circumstances under which, 
because of age alone, a person of 32 could not substitute for one of 33, or even 
of 40, yet we know that in most concerns responsibility increases with age and 
the office boy is younger than the president. 
To measure substitutability among ages is crucial for further study of the 
effects on production of changing age distribution. We repeat that without 
some knowledge (or in the absence of knowledge some surmise or implicit 
assumption) of substitutability we do not know whether a given change in age 
distribution is an advantage or a disadvantage or indifferent. Knowledge of sub- 
stitutability can be gained in a number of ways--by macroeconomics with the 
help of a production function whose parameters would tell the contribution of 
the various ages; by questioning employers on the desirability of workers of 
various ages in the several occupations; by observation of productivity of per- 
sons of different ages in activities where measurement is possible. The least one 
can say is that assertions on the  effect of changing age distributions on pro- 
duction must be suspect if they do not take into account this element. Pend- 
ing such investigation we shall assume in what follows that there is an  age ele- 
ment in production; that  some, but not complete, substitution is possible 
among workers of different ages. We go on to a little noticed paradox on the 
effect of changing cohorts on promotion. Strange as it may seem, the standard 
literature on the subject is concerned with slots and pay and promotion, but 
disregards that  the purpose of each job is to get  some work done. 
Production and promotion 
Suppose, in order to make the argument simple, that  there is limited sub- 
stitutability among ages, and that  in 1992, 10 years from now, we will need the 
same proportion of 20-24 year olds as in 1982, which is to say we will need about 
5 million more 01 them than the 18 million then available according to the 
official projection. That would mean more demand for the services of the 20- 
24 year olds, and so their wages will be high--in a wage sense they will be pro- 
moted young. But in a job sense the opposite would apply-they will be held 
back by the fewness of their numbers. If they do not work longer hours, they 
will have to stay more years on the same job in order to make up for their few- 
ness. (If they are willing to work longer hours then the problem disappears, 
but differentials by age in number of hours worked per week seems an 
unlikely solution.) 
They could well regard themselves as blocked by large cohorts ahead of 
them, now ensconced in jobs of greater responsibility. The effect of these con- 
tradictory influences--advancement in pay but retardation in job responsibility 
has not been fairly considered. 
The standard way of looking at the matter is at  its best on the advantages 
accruing to the small cohort that is preceded and followed by large cohorts. A 
larger younger cohort will require teachers and supervisors, and so the small 
cohort will be pushed up by those following it, as happened in the 1960s to the 
fortunate small group born in the 1930s. Later in its career i t  will also be 
drawn upwards by the large cohort that is older as the latter approaches retire- 
ment; there will be plentiful good slots to be filled. This is aside from the simple 
play of supply and demand; insofar as jobs are age-specific the wages of a small 
group of applicants will be &her than if the applicants were more numerous. 
The case is very different for a small cohort that is followed by other small 
coliorts. For then the first element-need for supervisors and teachers--does 
not enter. And the fact that there are few people and many jobs of entry level 
that need doing causes genuine difEculty to management. It will be a long time 
before these young people can be drawn into the senior jobs that will be 
vacated by the retirement of their elders, and in meantime they are needed 
longer a t  the bottom. Let us examine in more detail the arithmetic for prospec- 
tive changes in the United States of the decade 1982-92. 
There were 21,088 thousand persons aged 20-24 in 1982, and if this age 
group grows as the population total it would be up to 23,050 thousand by 1992. 
If the proportion of jobs that need doing at the several ages does not change, the 
shortfall would be substantial: only 17,798 thousand people to do the work of 
23,050 thousand. How can the shortage of more than 5 million be made up? 
Unless working hours are lengthened for t h s  group then those who are too few 
can only make up for their fewness by staying more years before they are pro- 
moted to the work done by 25-29 people. After they have attained the age of 25 
they will have to act as though they are still 24; as far as promotion to inore 
responsible work is concerned they will just have to wait. We assume in this 
exposition that a person can do any job suited to a younger person, but cannot 
do those of older people. 
The deficit in the numbers 20-24 can be made up by each working 5 times 
23,050/17,798 or 6.48 years. They would stay in the 20-24 kinds of jobs for 6.48 
years rather than the 5 years of 1982. The division point for the ages would not 
be 25 years but 28.08 years, taking account of a similar deficiency at  ages 15-19. 
Though the deficiency at  ages 15-19 will not have so large an effect insofar as 
most of these are not in the labor force anyhow. To be strict we ought to do the 
calculation not with the total population but only with that part of it that is par- 
ticipating in the labor force. Needless to say this calculation, developed in detail 
in Table 3, is for illustrative purposes only, and does not pretend to forecast 
the quantitative delay in promotion that will actually occur. 
The columns of Table 3 correspond to the above account. Column 1) is the 
1982 population of both sexes for the United States, column 2) that of 1992 as 
forecast by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Fullerton 1982). Column 3) pbsits 
requrements at the several ages as the same proportion of the estimated 1992 
total population that the ages were in 1982. The number of years that would 
have to be served in 1992 by each of those in the age group is given by column 
4), and the cumulative of column 4) is shown as the age boundaries in column 5). 
opt. t;. 
-4 
0 1 
Table 3. Age intervals that would enable the 1992 population to fill the 1982 jobs, 
rn (D and corresponding delay in promotion, United States. 
4 g g. 
g " Mean Delay or 2 Pop '82 Pop '92 Requared '92 Width Bound1 Bound 2 bound displacement 
5- CJI 
% z Age (1) (2)  (3 (4) (51 (6) (7) (8) 
averages the two interpolations. Column 8) gives the cumulative displacement, 
which is to say the cumulative delay in promotion across the age boundary. 
The table estimates a delay increasing up to age 30, and then diminishing 
virtual:; to zero by age 50, at  which point the excess of people 30 to 49 has offset 
the shortage 15 to 29. The example serves to show how the position of the 
young cohort is very different when we take account of the work to be done, 
rather than merely of slots to b;e filled and pay to be drawn. 
With the shortage of entry level applicants we can expect some changes in 
the definition of who is the right incumbent for many occupations. Suppose that 
there is a shortage of 5 million men in their 20s but an increase of 10 million 
women in their 30s and 40s, partly due to the continued movement of women 
with children into the labor force, partly to low fertility that means fewer women 
kept a t  home looking after chldren. One can hardly imagine a shortage in one 
age-sex group coexisting with a surplus in another without pressure for substitu- 
tion. Similar forces in the decades after the war enabled women largely to take 
over from men the occupation of bank teller among others. ~ G c h  changes 
would neutralize some of the effect illustrated in Table 3, the entrants being 
relieved of part of the consequences of their fewness. In exchange the women 
in their 30s would be taking over the entry jobs, i.e, jobs below what their'age 
would have entitled to. The shortage of entrants at the youngest ages means 
that someone has to stay longer in the junior posts, i.e, to accept promotion to 
more senior work later than would otherwise be necessary. 
More possibility of substitution softens the Easterlin effect by which the 
small cohort is better paid, and it also softens the somewhat opposite effect 
demonstrated in Table 3. This section has shown that any serious consideration 
of promotion as well as of the returns to labor a t  different ages must take 
account of substitutability and of the pace of technical change. Once the pace of 
change becomes so rapid that it cannot be accommodated by the succession of 
generations then pressure on individuals to change occupations in mid-career 
becomes strong. Those who are not adaptable enough to change tend to be 
forced out. This is probably one of the causes of earlier retirement shown by the 
declining participation rates of older ages in Table 5--though we will find that its 
main cause is the social security system. 
PART I1 AGE AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMPTTON, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SOCIAL SECURITY 
The two important units for study of age distribution: 
Family and nation 
Any human aggregate has an age distribution, and one is often required to 
examine the consequences of changing age distribution in a province or city. 
But the two kinds of population for which age distribution is most revealing are 
the family and the nation. It is in the degree to which each is effectively an 
economic collectivity that age distribution is important for them. What makes 
the investigation of the relation between their distributions potentially useful is 
the fact that the larger unit is made up of an  aggregate of the smaller, and 
changes in the smaller in specific ways have consequences for the larger. 
The question for us will be then, how the superposition of families one on 
the other makes a certain age distribution for the nation. The question is analo- 
gous to that concerning the timing of births in the family and cohort and the 
period birth rate of the country, as studied by Ryder and others. Various pro- 
positions can be demonstrated mathematically; for instance that the period 
birth rate is lowered compared with the cohort birth rate by a fraction equal to 
the ratio of annual change in the mean age of childbearing to the cohort birth 
rate. If the age of childbearing is going up by one tenth of a year each year then 
the period rate will be lower than the cohort rate by 10 per cent. 
We need corresponding propositions for the effect of the change in family 
sizes and ages at of marriage and childbearing on the age distribution of the 
population. Ths  would regard family formation as a cohort process, and the 
age distribution at  any given time as the cross-section of what is taking place in 
a number of cohorts that exist simultaneously at different stages in their 
careers. 
The family is so tightly knit an earning and spending unit that there is 
not even a way of ascertaining the effective incomes of its several members. In 
a one earner family the income can be imputed to the one who brings it into the 
family, but in the course of within-family distribution that person may receive 
only a small part of the benefits. That will apply if there are many children, 
and especially in that case the distribution is very different in the several stages 
of the family's life. 
Immediately after the family is formed by a marriage there are likely to be 
two earners, and earnings pooled so that each spends approximately half of the 
earnings pool. When children come the number of earners might drop from 
two to  one, and the number of consumers rise to three, four and five succes- 
sively. Expenditures will not be equal among the members, but the earner is 
likely to have considerably less than half of the total. As the family grows up 
the costs of the members other than the head will increase, and perhaps reach 
a maximum when the head is in his forties, perhaps considerably before his 
income attains its maximum. Then the children leave home, perhaps the wife 
takes a job, and expenditure can rise considerably, just at  a time when the 
need for expenditure is much less pressing. Finally, the time comes when the 
couple cannot earn anything by their own efforts, and if they are an indepen- 
dent unit they must live on the saving that they have accumulated--though 
with family solidarity they are aided by the chldren who received the benefit 
of their earlier efforts. 
The familiar story of the family cycle is worth telling here as part of our 
analysis of age &stribution only because it shows how an important unit copes 
with changing age composition. The usefulness of exchanges among the several 
stages of the family cycle is clear. The aging but not yet old couple can set 
aside some of their income for their old age; they can also save before the chil- 
dren arrive to prepare for the time of heavy expenditure. It would be a further 
advantage to them to be able to borrow at  the time of greatest expenditures, 
and pay back later when the chldren have left home. 
The fact that before the welfare state came into existence the family were 
able to handle the radical change in age composition to which it is necessarily 
subject ought to inspire any consideration of how the nation is to handle its 
changes in age distribution. For though we speak of an aging process that will 
take place over the next half century or so in the United States and other 
countries, with a fall in the number of children, the amount of aging is trifling 
compared with what the individual family must undergo. 
The nation has an easier time than the family. It does not have to save in 
order to handle the unevenness in the relation of income to expenditure, but 
can simply transfer among families. Thus the families that are at  the height of 
their earnings and without children to support can contribute to the schooling of 
those that have children; those that are beyond the age where they. can earn 
their own living can be supported by those who are working. Without anyone sav- 
ing anything the expenditure curves for individuals can be smoothed out so that 
despite greatly varying numbers of claimants within the family and conven- 
tional salary differentials by age they can have a relatively uniform age-curve of 
individual expenditure. At least attempts along this line are written into the tax 
laws of nearly all countries, as well as into their social welfare programs. In 
the freest of free market economies that exist today there is a large measure 
of this kind of mutual help, quite distinct from the mutual help of workers in 
producing the output of a factory. The mutual help in consumption is instituted 
either to smooth out the variations in the life course of the individual or to 
diminish the spread of incomes that a free market generates. It is the former 
that will be our main interest here as we try to learn something about the 
effects of age distributions. Cooperation in consumption being very different 
from cooperation in production we will need to have methods for its study 
correspondingly different; it is to these two separate asl.tects that the two parts 
of this working paper are respectively dedicated. 
Quasi-interest on zero investment 
Two features of the consumption-helping process are worth mention. In 
comparison with the individual family struggling along on its own, the collec- 
tivity can help its members without accumulating a fund. Its taxes collected for 
education are paid out in school construction and support as soon as 
received; its social security taxes are immediately spent on the old people of 
the moment. If the age distribution is stable i t  could even out the consumption 
of its citizens through their life course without anyone saving anythmg. More- 
over if the age distribution is stable and the population increasing the corn- 
munity could seem to obtain interest on a fund that it has not saved! A t  least 
this applies to the provision for the old; what Samuelson (1958) calls the biolog- 
ical rate of interest is available; each generation can get more in old age pension 
than it contributed, simply because of the growth of population and income 
between the time when it contributed and when it drew. In a rapidly increasing 
population old age pensions are cheap, a t  the same time as education costs 
are b h ;  insofar as children have to be schooled before they become earners 
there are more of them in relation to the earners a t  any one time. The chil- 
dren, belonging to a later and therefore larger cohort, have their schooling 
cost paid by the smaller working cohort of the time, an effect that will be 
identified with negative interest. 
We can provide an  arithmetic example of what all this amounts to by sup- 
posing some rate of increase, taking it that the school children average 10 
years of age, the working population 35 years, and the retired 70 years. Table 4 
shows by how much the effective burden is modified by the sole fact of popula- 
tion growth. For instance a t  3 per cent it is as though 142 per cent was added to 
the amount set aside for the old, and as though 59 per cent was deducted from 
the payments made for the care of the young. 
Table 4. Effective quasi-interest paid or received on un- 
funded provision for schoolingand for pensions. 
Percent advantage or loss per person working, 
compared with cost in a stationary population. 
Assumed mean age o f  Effective percent interest  on unit with 
benefit or of work population growing a t  
Schooling: 10 0 -726 -45 -59 
Work : 40 - 0 0 0 0 
Pension : 70 0 3 5 81 14 3 
Thus under a rapid increase of population schooling of the young is a seri- 
ous problem, while the care of the aged is surprisingly easy. When the rate of 
growth slows, ultimately as it must to zero, then the schools are partly empty 
on the one hand, and there is the crisis of social security that we know about. 
The entire structure based on growth-generated quasi-interest collapses. 
Thus we have seen the contrast between the individual and the collectivity 
in respect of the capacity to shift the time when income is spent. The indivi- 
dual can defer the spending of income; he cannot advance it. He can save for 
the college education of b s  children out of income earned before the age of 
about 50, say; he cannot send them to college with the income that he will 
later earn about the age of 60. 
A person would have considerably more flexibility ,if the law permitted an 
effective pledge of future income. One can borrow on bonds or other collateral, 
but that is simply converting past income. In order to pledge future income 
one would have to consent to some effective sanction for ensuring that the debt 
be collectible. Our laws protecting debtors are so effective and wide-reaching 
that they prevent the advancing of credit, for instance on future salary, beyond 
a very small scale a t  very Q h  interest rates. The law would have to permit 
people to sell themselves into slavery before there could be any substantial 
spending in advance of earning. 
lncidentally to protecting the debtor the law making impossible an effective 
pledge of repayment prevents some of the indebtedness that would otherwise 
occur, and thus may have the function--even though that is not its explicit 
purpose--of causing the community's saving to be greater than it would be 
without laws protecting debtors. 
The LDCs and the decline of fertility 
Table 4 has clear implications for the development process, showing as it 
does how population growth increases the burden of the young a t  the same 
time as it diminishes that of the old. Tbs is a new way of expressing a very old 
proposition, one that goes back at least to Coale and Hoover (1958), in whch it 
is shown that the accumulation of capital is hndered by the need to care for 
many children, and to provide the new labor force with existing tools before the 
economy can be renovated--to express the matter much too briefly. We find 
that the notion of quasi-interest is useful insofar as it contrasts the effects of 
children and the aged. The comparison has attained a certain currency 
recently, partly through the discussions of the World Assembly on Ageing, held 
in Vienna this year. 
It has always been known that following the decline of fertility there comes 
a negative element in development that parallels the positive effects on 
resources and the accumulation of capital. We cannot get the benefits of con- 
taining the pressure on resources and greater capital accumulation per worker 
without an increase in the aged relative to the number of workers. The advan- 
tages of the chain-letter game that is played out in an increasing population, 
by which ever more young people are available to support each old person are 
discussed below. These advantages apply indifferently whether individual 
parents are supported by their own children, or the community supports older 
people through social security. The cnain-letter game cannot be played forever, 
and the question is whether to stop it now, or at  some later time when further 
difficulties associated with the larger population will have accumulated. 
The World Assembly on Ageing meeting in Vienna in 1982 made much of the 
difficulty in the maintenance of the old that arises in the wake of control of fer- 
tility. The opponents of family planning would like to take advantage of their late 
discovery of old age. It might have been better if demographers, who were 
never in doubt about this point, had made more of it publicly in the debate on 
family planning, so that there would have been no reason for the public to dis- 
cover it with surprise and disappointment. Some demographers have indeed 
laid stress on this, notably Coale (1980) in relation to China's dilemma in the 
adoption of the one-child family. These points are reviewed a recent UNFPA 
(1982) paper. 
Yet ultimately, all agree, any advantage of growth is at best tem- 
porary; like a chain letter (though not as quickly) it has sooner or later to come 
to an end. 
Social security wealth 
By the mere enactment of the law establishing social insurance wealth was 
created amounting to trillions of dollars. There must be somethng wrong 
with the preceding statement; since the enactment did not produce even one 
dollar's worth of goods how could it make a gift of trillions to the nation? The 
answer is that it provided some individuals with claims on other individuals, 
and the aggregate of the claims constitutes wealth for the former. 
There are at  least four ways of reckoning this wealth for a cohort of given 
age. 
1) We can take the simple value of what that cohort will get on the  aver- 
age by living as long as the prospective life table says and disregard their con- 
tributions on the grounds that they have to pay taxes anyhow. Thus for a cohort 
aged x the wealth that will ultimately be received is an expected T65/1x per per- 
son, or about 14 times the annual benefit, say $5000 in the United States, or 
$70,000 per person now working. Multiplying by the 100 million or so in the 
labor force gives $7 trillion in total. It is not clear whether we should also 
include those who have not yet started to work and so bring the total to $10 tril- 
lion. 
2) We can consider only the present value of that amount, discounted at  
some suitable rate of interest. Since the amount is indexed we should discount 
by the real rate of interest, whatever that is going to be over the next 50 years 
or so. This is presumably the $2.4 trillion that was often mentioned in the 
literature of the 1970s (Feldstein 1974); in 1982 dollars it would be correspond- 
ingly larger. 
3) We can take the accumulated payments of all persons now contributing, 
as though each was buying an annuity to start at age 65. That is the amount he 
would have to his credit if the operation had been fully funded, which is to say 
if each cohort had been paying for itself. Our formula of the earlier paper 
(Keyfitz, 1981) shows that this is about 6 times the annual drawings (i.e. about 
six times the annual contributions since no reserve is being built up) or over 
$1 trillion. 
4) We can take account of the taxes to be paid, and then we can only find 
that the wealth represented by social security is zero, in the same sense that 
the wealth represented by the national debt is zero, on the grounds in both 
cases that claims by one individual against others are neither assets nor liabili- 
ties for the community as a whole. Thus social security constitutes wealth in 
the sense that the national debt is wealth. 
At the same time it must be pointed out to those who worry about the 
national debt of 91 trillion, that the total of claims that it represents is only 
about one seventh or one tenth that of social security calculated on the 
corresponding basis of 1) above. (Peter sen, 1982) 
The Chain Letter Principle 
The advantage of a chain letter to those who mitiate it and the disadvan- 
tage to those that follow after are well-known. If each recipient pays his dollar 
to the name at  the top of the list and sends the letter on to four new people 
whose names he adds at  the bottom, then provided the necessary discipline is 
maintained and enough new addressees are found, each participant will get the 
fourth power of four dollars back after four cycles of mail. If there are 10 per- 
sons on the list participants will obtain 10 billion dollars back, always provided 
that enough new participants willing to maintain the discipline can be found. 
(It would need more than twice the present world population for the original 
sender to get his 310 billion, and the same number of people for the next 
sender). It is the same with social security on the pay-as-you-go basis, except 
that the cycle is not the time for a mailing, but the length of a generation. U.S. 
law forbids the use of the mails for the chain letter, but requires the chain letter 
principle for social security. 
All t h s  has been said before, but perhaps the analogy of the increasing 
population to a rate of interest has not been sufficiently stressed. If a letter 
takes a week in the mail, then the chain letter with four names provides a rate 
of interest of 300 per cent per week; one with 10 names of 900 per cent per 
week. Our Table 4 showed the (more modest) implicit returns on pension contri- 
butions. 
It helps understanding to realize that the formula for cost p d e r  a funded 
scheme with rate of interest r is identical with the formula for a pay-as-you-go 
scheme with rate of increase r. The growth of population works just as does 
interest to increase the return that the individual participant receives. (For a 
proof see the earlier working paper, ~eyfitz,l981) 
As the s c h e ~ e  matures and the population increase slows people seem to 
be getting less and less for their money. If the benefits are to be maintained 
then the contributions have to be raised. That is what has been happening in 
all countries where the contributions have been specifically levied for this pur- 
pose. (Where the benefits are paid out of the general treasury the same 
phenomenon occurs but there is no costing system to reveal it.) Since the drop 
to stationarity is sooner or later inevitable if only because space and 
resources are Anite, the quasi-interest obtained because of population increase 
is necessarily temporary. 
A calculation that would demonstrate the chain letter more empirically 
than t h s  paper has done would be to take individual contribution records and 
link them to benefit entitlements. Records for categories of individuals could 
perhaps be obtained simply from the regulations that existed from year to year 
during the history of the scheme. One could for each individual or for each 
category see what percent interest he or she effectively obtained. One very 
rough calculation shows that early participants averaged a generous 7 per cent 
or more in real terms; those who retired in the 1960s and the 1970s averaged 
about 3 per cent, and those retiring now are getting their contributions back 
without interest. It is in the nature of a chain letter that later participants, say 
in the 1990s, will balance this out with negative interest; such a balancing out 
must occur since the scheme as such does not produce anything, and sta- 
tionarity is in the end inevitable. (Though the scheme does not produce any- 
thmg its administrative costs are a creditable one percent or less of the 
amount handled and can be disregarded for our purposes.) If one person gets 
more than in the long run another must get less, and early participants are 
favored over later. The mechanisms of this process deserve both theoretical 
clarification and empirical study. 
In such study one would have to distinguish between open and closed sys- 
tems. The idea of the chain letter is that it is expected to be open, which is to 
say that ever increasing numbers of persons would continue to enter. All such 
arrangements that come to an end, in that the recruitment to the chain drops 
to zero, are plainly zero sum, which is to say that they have amounted only to an 
exchange, with the losses exactly equal to the gains. An intermediate condition 
is the chain does not end, but drops from increase to stationarity. From that 
moment the further entrants get their money back, and those who were in the 
scheme in the increasing phase have made their gains at  no cost to anyone else. 
The only sense in which their gain cost anyone anything is that all subsequent 
players now must be on the pay-as-you-go system rather than on the funded 
system. This is no disadvantage as long as exact stationarity is maintained in 
the population but moment that there start to be waves then we k v e  the 
difficulties mentioned frequently in t h s  paper. 
The theory would then go on to see to what extent every such scheme is 
asymptotically closed. Ths  is in the sense that as time goes along the gains 
must be a smaller and smaller part of the sum of transactions. The closure pro- 
perty is the equivalent of the well-known fact that an exponential, however small 
its (positive) parameter, cannot continue for an infinite time. 
No one should be surprised that the moment when the rate of return has 
fallen to zero and threatens to become negative is the moment when the public 
and coGress  become alarmed, and successive Commissions are appointed. 
But the maturing of the system need not occur once and for all. When a 
new group enters the labor force-for instance married women in the 1 9 6 0 ~ -  
that gives a new start, since the entrants provide contributions and they do not 
yet draw. That has to end when all the women who are going to enter the 
labor force have come in. Other groups previously omitted can be drawn in by 
legislation-farmers, self-employed, public servants who have resisted incor- 
poration up to now. Each such group enables the existing contribution schedule 
to be continued for a little longer without any diminution of benefits. 
However, this is not all, for the chain letter principle is sustained by 
another quite different agency. Rising wages have the same effect as popula- 
tion increase. Wages rising a t  3 per cent per year will enable everyone to seem 
to be obtaining 3 per cent return on contributions. This applies whether the 
rise of 3 per cent is due to inflation, in which case the 3 per cent is a money 
return, or if the rise of 3 per cent is due to rising productivity, in which case 
the participants get a real 3 per cent return on contributions. 
The impact of social security on age of retirement 
Beneficiaries under the retirement program of the US OASDHI (Old-Age, 
Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance) rose from 13,918,000 in 1965 to 
22,421,000 in 1979, and benefits paid out went from $12.5 billion to 67.1 
billion.(Statistical Abstract, 1981, p. 324). Ths five-fold increase has as one of 
its causes the fall from 27.9 per cent of males 65 and over working in 1965 to 
20.0 per cent in 1979. We will examine what fraction of labor force changes are 
accounted for by changed labor particpation rates. 
Table 5 shows a drop in male participation rates at all ages for the United 
States and Japan; a more extensive calculation for the 13 countries of our Table 
6 contains no group in any country in whlch the male participation rates are 
foreseen to increase over the decade. Females rates, on the other hand, are 
expected to increase, in greater degree at most ages than the male decrease. 
But what dominates Table 5 from the present viewpoint is the decline in partici- 
pation rates at age 65 and over, for both sexes, typically around 1 per cent per 
year. (On the other hand population growth at  old ages is great enough that the 
absolute number of workers continues to increase.) 
Comparison of Japan and the United States in many of the respects with 
which we are here concerned is hardly to the advantage of the latter. Japan 
shows 89.6 per cent of adult males in the labor force, compared to the US 85.3; 
46.0 of its males 65 and over were active compared with 22.9 per cent for the 
US. Japan has a higher percent of its population enrolled in secondary school 
(Statistical Abstract 1981, p.873); it spent somewhat less in proportion on edu- 
cation (5.7 per cent of GNP as against the US 6.3 per cent), but one suspects 
spent it more effectively in better-disciplined schools; had 2 per cent of its labor 
force unemployed in 1980 compared with 7.1 per cent (p.682); and showed 
930,000 days lost in industrial disputes in 1979 compared with over 15 million. 
Table 5. Average annual increases in population, labor force, 
and participation rates, 1980-1990, for the United 
States and Japan. 
POPULATION LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female 
UNITED STATES 
10-14 0.79 0.74 -0.47 -0.36 -1.25 -1.09 
15-19 -1.56 -1.61 -2.92 -2.30 -1.36 -0.69 
20-24 -1.68 -1.67 -1.89 -1.50 -0.21 0.17 
25-44 2.41 2.26 2.39 2.90 -0.02 0.64 
45- 54 1.01 0.88 0.96 1.54 -0.04 0.66 
55-64 -0.37 -0.34 -0.61 0.15 -0.24 0.49 
65+ 1.32 1.51 0.38 0.99 -0.95 -0.53 
JAPAN 
Source: ILO forecast 1975-2000 
On the variable of age of retirement the influence of social security is 
clear, though measuring the effect quantitatively is difficult. It is not unnatural; 
that with each expansion of the benefits-including provision for dependents and 
indexing--further millions of people are drawn into retirement. Some of the 
underestimate of costs is due to this effect of social security on behavior. If at 
each new stage, in considering some new benefit, it was assumed that people 
would continue working to the same age as before, and the new benefit caused 
many to advance their retirement plans, then some of the history of underes- 
timate of costs becomes understandable. It is not easy to take account of such 
behavioral responses in actuarial calculptions. 
At least in retrospect we can ascertain how much of added cost and of 
diminished contribution is due to earlier retirement in exactly the same way 
that we have analysed mortality and fertility. One would take the cost (say for 
the retired) with retired fractions of 1960, and of 1980 and see how much the 
difference was. Ths  would be added to the purely demographic differences 
obtained as described above. The same can be applied to the future, using the 
prospective retirement ratio presented by the ILO against the ratio fixed at the 
1875 level. 
The use of the word 'cause' is bound to give trouble in the present context. 
We may be able to say that so much of the increase of cost is due to mortality 
change insofar as we can demonstrate this with a direct numerical decomposi- 
tion. We can likewise say that earlier retirement was responsible for some 
part of the increased cost. But when we come to a closer analysis we are in 
trouble; there is no way of saying how much of the earlier retirement is due to 
the social security scheme, on the one side, and how much is due to changed 
Lifestyle, lower ambition, or other cultural change on the other side. That kind 
of decomposition is beyond any possible computing. 
The crisis of social security in the 1980s is not due to aging 
Yet despite much that has been written, the aging of the population is not 
the cause of present difficulties in social security. In fact the demographics 
have been relatively favorable for the last few years. The baby boom has been 
moving into employment, that is into contribution status, and the retirees are 
those who were born prior to  1920. While the birth rate had not by 1920 
decended to its low point, yet the absolute number of births was only about 2 
million in the United States, and even adding subsequent immigrants does not 
bring the number in retirement year by year to any very high figure. 
The prospect for the next few years is mixed: entrants into the labor force 
will be fewer, but it will not be long before the new retirees are the births of the 
1930s, and the scheme will be given a respite as far as this factor is concerned. 
One way of thinking about the matter is to compare the population 15-19 
with that 60-64. The former group are about to enter the labor force, and the 
latter are about to retire. In 1982 the former are estimated at  19.4 million for 
the United States, the latter at 10.3 million. Additonal to these prospective 
entrants into the labor force and retirement respectively are immigrants who 
can be assumed to enter mostly a t  working ages. 
Counting those present in 1082, the net increase of the labor force from 
1982 to 1987 is approximately 19 - 10 = 9 million, of the retired population about 
10 million. These additions will raise the ratio of retired to workers during the 
next five years; taking ratios the working ages will increase by about 5 per cent, 
the retired ages about 50 per cent. Looking further down the line, in the follow- 
ing five years the entrants into the labor force will be about 2 million lower, the 
exits at  retiring age about 1 million higher than in 1982-7, so the change from 
1987 to 1992 will again be adverse. Similar calculations of increments to the 
labor force and aged population respectively over successive five-year periods 
show in each interval proportionately more going into the aged category. 
Expressing the same matter in terms of the ratio of those over 65 to those 
20-64, the demographic element in the social security burden, we find 0.11 in 
1940, a deterioration to  0.17 in 1970, a trifling rise to 0.18 during the subse- 
quent 10 years, then a slow upward movement, and only about 2020 a sharp 
rise within a few years to fully 0.27 (US Statistical Abstract, 1081). Note that the 
impending bankruptcy of the social security fund during the 1980s is occurring 
a t  a time when the demographic burden is rising less rapidly than either before 
or after. If the pensions are grossly underpriced even in a time when the demo- 
graphic factors are not unfavorable, indeed as the baby boom is entering work- 
ing age, then a fortiori they are underpriced in relation to long-term costs. The 
reasons fnr the underpricing have to do with the political process, rather than 
with the' demography. There will be time enough to blame the demography in 
the 21st century. 
For the developed countries as a whole, according to the United Nations 
the net increase in the population aged 15-64 will be 59.0 million from 1980 to  
1980, and in the population 65 and over 12.7 million In relation to the 1980 
numbers of 742.3 and 127.7million that means that the proportional increase of 
the old is only slightly more than that of the working age population, and the 
working age population remains a t  66 per cent of the whole. A small increase of 
those too old to work is offset by a slight decrease--at least according to this 
projection--of those too young to work. 
In summary, the demographic factor is not the main cause of the present 
difficulties either in the United States or in the developed countries as a whole. 
Prior to late in the first quarter of the 21st century we have to seek other causes 
causes tor the crisis of social security; after 2020 demographic causes will dom- 
inate. Let us look into the several demographic causes to see which are more 
and which are less important when demography becomes operative. 
Decomposition of age changes 
Partly to show the usefulness of the technique, we first break down the 
increase of the female labor force in the United States according to the 
increase in number of women of working age, and increase in participation 
rates. In Table 6 we note for the United States an overall ratio of labor force in 
1990 to that in 1980 of 1.136, i.e. an increase of 13.6 per cent 
Table 6. Decomposition of female labor force ratio, 1gg0/ 
1980 into component due to participation rates and 
component due to population,for , I3  countries. 
Rat io  PARTICIPATION POPULATION 
1990/ EFFECT EFFECT 
Country 1980 Ra t io  Pe rcen t  Ra t io  Percent  
AUSTRALIA 1.208 1.034 17.2 1.167 82.7 
BRAZIL 1.504 1.125 27.0 1.337 72.9 
CANADA 1.164 1.045 -29.6 1.109 70-3  
FRANCE 1.136 1.049 37.8 1.081 62.1 
ITALY 1 .lo0 1.054 55.8 1.043 44.1 
JAPAN 
MEXICO 
NETHERLANDS 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
UNITED 
STATES 
WEST 
GERMANY 
Source: Ca lcu la t ion  based on IU) f o r e c a s t  1975-2000. 
The pure population effect is a ratio of 1.086 if the 1980 participation rates are 
used for both dates, and a ratio of 1.090 if the 1990 rates are used. (The latter 
not shown in the table.) These numbers are close enough that one can average 
them, and say that the population effect is 1.088 or an increase 8.8 per cent. 
Similarly the participation effect is an increase of 4.3 per cent. If we take the 
fraction 4.3/(4.3 + 8.8) as due to participation change and 8.8/(4.3 + 8.8) as due 
to population change we obtain the 33.3 percent and the 66.7 per cent shown. 
The aftermath of the baby boom is twice as influential in determining labor force 
numbers as increasing participation rates. In the United States the baby boom 
peak was higher than in other industrial countries, and the population factor 
correspondingly more important in explaining changes. 
It is natural to t h n k  of the prolonging of life as responsible for the 
difficulty of supporting the old, and that it is lower mortality that raises the 
contributions required for a given level of social security. Elementary demogra- 
phy gives the appearance of confirming this. One observes that the expec- 
tation of life about 1930 was 60 years; about 1945 t h s  had risen to 65 years; in 
1960 it was 68 years; in 1990 it will surely be 75 years. Sole reference to these 
expected values suggests that the number of years over 65, once null, is now 
rising towards 10. Such a dramatic increase must surely decisively affect social 
security. Some such thinking seems to lie behind popular articles on the sub- 
ject. 
Further knowledge of demography shows such reasoning in terms of 
expected values at birth to be wholly wrong. The expectation life at birth has 
nothing to do with the matter insofar as it is affected by mortality in infancy 
and childhood. What counts is the fraction of workers who survive to draw 
benefits, and the mean length of time after retirement that such workers live. 
In life table terms these two factors are 765/(120 - T65) and T65/165 respec- 
tively, which multiplied together make T65/(T20 - T65), where Tx is the number 
of persons over age x in the stationary population, say with radix 100,000. Thus 
the decisive ratio is those of retired age to those of working age in the stationary 
population. 
Alternative projections 
Another and more immediately empirical approach to this question is to 
decompose the change in the projected population into its elements. When we 
do so it turns out that the decline of fertility is ultimately a bigger element than 
mortality in any demographically caused increase in the burden of social secu- 
rity. It is not so much that there are more old people than there would have 
been with the mortality rates of a generation ago, but there are fewer people of 
working age to support them than there would have been if the fertility decline 
of the 1960s and 1970s had not occurred. We will estimate the strength of the 
two factors over the course of the next half-century. 
The obvious method is to project the population with the lower mortality 
Likely to evolve over the next generation, and also with mortality fixed at the 
level of 1975, say. The difference has to be due to mortality change as it would 
take place. Then we can do the same with the fertility expected to evolve as 
against the fertility fixed at  the level of 1975. The difference will be due to fer- 
tility change. Call p(m0,fO) the population, say in 2030, resulting from 1975 
mortality and fertility, and correspondingly for the other combinations. Then 
for the pure effect of mortality change we would have p(m1,fl)-p(m0,fl) at 
the 2030 fertility level, and p(ml,f0)-p(m0,fO) at  the 1975 level of fertility. The 
average of these, which it is permissible to use if they are not very different, 
gives the net effect of mortality. Similarly p(m1 ,f 1)-p(m1,fO) averaged with 
p(m0,fl)-p(m0,fO) gives the pure effect of fertility. 
The technique can be applied equally to the pension cost in absolute 
terms, to  the contributions in absolute terms, to the ratio of the former to the 
latter, to schooling cost, and to any other function of age. I t  can be applied 
decade by decade for the last 40 years, and to projections over the next 100 
years. 
Some simple models for long-term social security costs 
We cannot discuss long-term costs of the social security scheme without 
some conception of how population and work are going to evolve during the 
coming years. To start with the very simplest hypothesis, suppose in the ulti- 
mate stationary condition for which we must prepare that each person starts 
work at  age 20, retires a t  65, and then lives on to 80. The person works for 45 
years, and lives on pension for 15 years. If everyone is in this condition, and the 
population is stationary, with a fixed number feeding in each year--say 
100,000--then for a pension equal to the (supposed uniform) salary the contribu- 
tion each year will have to be exactly 25 per cent of salary. For with three per- 
sons working for each one retired, the contributions would be 3 /4  of salary 
for the retired persons, and each of those working would retain 3/4 of salary, 
so the person would have a lifetime income of 3/4 of the nominal salary. It is 
as though three full salaries are earned for each 4 persons in the population, 
and they are divided equally among the four. 
We can take account of mortality in the stationary condition by referring to 
a life table Tx column. For the United States 1979 table T20 - T65 was 4136 on a 
radix of 1000, and T65 was 1272. For 100 per cent replacement with everyone 
working to age 65 and then retiring the fraction of salary that would have to be 
taken in tax would be 1272/(1272 + 4136) whch is 24 per cent. One way to think 
of this is to say that if each working person receives $1 then together they 
receive $4136, and this sum would have to be divided among 5408 persons, so 
each would receive 4136/5408 before as after retirement, or $0.76. 
Such calculations can be improved by several feasible modifications: 
1) Suppose that people are satisfied with 60 per cent of the uniform 
salary on retirement. After all a considerable part of the expenditures of 
working people are directly connected with their work; this includes many 
items of clothng, transport, restaurant meals, entertaining, and even some 
housing insofar as housing accessible to the place of place of work is more 
expensive. Aside from this the retired person is not typically sending children 
to college and indeed is long past maximum financial responsibilities. We 
ought to consult budget studies to find how much the elements of 
a) work-related cost and 
b)diminution of responsibility 
amount to in a typical family for the several countries; suppose for now 
that they are 40 per cent of expenditure during working life, so that the 
person's own costs are 60 per cent of salary; then t h s  would be the right per- 
centage to provide for in old age in order that the person may live as well as 
when working. There are some costs of being old, especially health costs,but 
we will assume that these are covered under some scheme such as medicare, 
that does not come into the present calculation. 
In this situation the premium or contribution that the person would 
have to make while working would be 60 per cent of the 25 per cent of which 
we spoke earlier-4.e. the premium would be 15 per cent of salary. That is 
somewhat higher than the 13 per cent now contributed by employer and 
employee together in the United States; we will have to test how realistic it is 
in view of other qualifications. Replacement values for a number of countries 
are shown in Table 7. 
2) How much difference would it make if people insisted on retiring at  60, 
or if they were satisfied to  work until 70? Evidently a great deal. Retirement 
a t  60 on 60 per cent of salary on our zero mortality to age 80 hypothesis would 
I 
raise the tax from 15 per cent to 20 per cent; retirement at 70 would lower it to 
10 per cent. It would take twice as large a bite out of the salaries of all those 
working to provide for retirement a t  60 as at 70. Insofar as we have used a 
rectangular distribution rather than the actual downward sloping distribution 
Table 7. Replacement rates of social security old-age pensions 
for workers with average wages in manufacturing, and 
for couples, selected countries, 1969-80.  
PENSION AS PERCENT OF EARNINGS I N  YEAR 
BEFORE RETIREMENT 
Single worker Aged couple 
Country 1975 1980 1975 1980 
Austria 
Canada 
Denmark 
France 
Federal Republic of 51 49 
Germany 
I t a l y  61 69 
Japan 3 7 54 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United S ta t e s  
Source: Social  Security Bul le t in ,  Vo1.45, No.11, November 1982. 
this underestimates the difference that age of retirement makes. A calcula- 
tion using the life table is one stage more realistic; T60/(T20 - T60) is much 
more than twice T70/(T20 - T70). For the United Kingdom 1977-79, for exaam- 
ple, averaging the two sexes, we have 0.40 against 0.17; that is a tax of 40 per 
cent as  against one of 24 per cent for 100 per cent replacement. 
3) Our sense of equity would provide somewhat more for those with family 
responsibilities--in particular having a nonworking spouse who does not qualify 
for a pension on her own. Suppose that one t b r d  of the population are in this 
condition, and that they are entitled to a 50 per cent increase of pension on 
that account. With the standard age 65 retirement the 15 per cent premium for 
60 per cent replacement would go up by one sixth (1/3 x 1/2), to 17 1/2 per 
cent. 
4) Since on our assumptions the contributions are paid out as soon as 
collected and the population is stationary there is no fund and hence no 
interest accumulation in the usual sense. 
Suppose however that the economy is growing (say at 1 per cent per 
annum), that the growth is reflected in hgher  wages per worker, and hence 
in an increased take of the social security tax. The application of t h s  breaks 
down according as the pension is paid as a fraction of current wages or as a 
fraction of the wages received by the pensioner while he was working. If the 
replacement is of 60 per cent (or any other fraction) of current wages, then in 
the stationary condition a quasi-interest of 1 per cent per annum is obtained. 
If 60 per cent of the wages received by the person while working are replaced, 
then the premium would be reduced by something like the difference between 
current wages and those received a generation back, so the effective replace- 
ment rate is considerably less than 60 per cent. 
To repeat the earlier crude approximation of Table 4, if the rate of growth 
of real wages is 1 per cent per annum, and if the average age of pensioners is 70 
and of workers is 40, then we can t reat  the 1 per cent growth like a rate of 
interest, and say it accumulates something like 35 per cent during 30 years, 
and this constitutes a kind of dividend to reduce the premium to 74 per cent 
(=100/1.35) of what it would otherwise be, and hence that the premium is 
reduced by about 26 per cent. 
One has to be cautious about incorporating t h s  assumption, in that 
forecasting how the real wage will move over a long period is even more specu- 
lative than forecasting population. 
The next step in the direction of realism is to replace the uniform salary 
by a salary that varies with the age profile shown by the actual population. It is 
not obvious that it makes much difference whether one uses average salary or 
the profile--with the rlght kind of average, when interest does not enter it would 
make no difference at  all. But even where interest does not enter we have the 
equivalent of interest in the form of increase of wages, and the age gradient of 
salary makes a difference to the effective average. 
Test  with more realistic model 
The above simple models may be useful for an intuitive understanding of 
the relation of costs and benefits, and for explaining these to the public, but to 
see how the system would evolve under any given combination of contributions 
and benefits we need an actual projection. To go from 1975 to 2075 should 
suffice to indicate the long-term prospect. 
For any supposed contribution level the calculation would show over each 
five-year time interval what the income of the scheme would be and what the 
expenditure. A printout would say just how much was being taken from reserve 
or how much added in each five year period. In principle the hundred years 
should end with a zero balance. 
We can surmise what will happen before the calculation starts. During 
the 1880s and up to about 2020 the fund will keep rising, owing to the entry of 
the baby boom generation into the work force After about 2020 the fund will be 
drawn down owing to the retirement of the same baby boom. After about 2040 
there will be some relief as the low births of the 1970s retire, though such 
relief depends on the great unknown of which will happen to births over the next 
50 years starting now. 
A similar calculation is possible for the past. It is instructive to consider 
what might have resulted if one had applied such a method not to the population 
as it has actually evolved since 1935 but to the projection of population available 
in 1935 when the United States social security scheme was first legislated. At 
that time it was thought that births would continue to be low for the long term 
future, which is to say that the population would age much more rapidly than it 
In fact did. This should give a conservative statement of costs, which is to say 
that if anything the premiums required would have been overestimated. The cal- 
culation can be carried out with the population as it was projected not only in 
1935 but also as projected a t  various times since. 
To make the calculation realistic one would need to suppose some rate of 
interest to the fund during the time when it was positive, as well as some rate of 
interest for the borrowings when the fund was negative. One could go on to 
apply the rules concerning contributions in detail. More difficult would be the 
projecting of earnings and employment; one would have to make assumptions 
not only on the total wage bill but on the way it is distributed, since the formula 
sets a maximum for each worker. 
Cycles in births and the relation between the generations 
Questions of intergenerational equity do not arise in a population with fixed 
birth and death rates and hence steady increase. In such a population the age 
distribution is stable, and each generation has the same relation to its prede- 
cessors as its successors have to it. The required tax contributions to pay- 
as-you-go pensions are constant over time, and there can be no question of 
one cohort having a higher ratio of benefits to costs than another. 
With birth rates that fluctuate the question of intergenerational equity 
assumes considerable importance. Since cycles seem to be inseparable from 
the use of birth control we can count on public attention to equity for the 
indefinite future. The most trouble will be given by cycles of two generations 
in wave-length. It is cycles that change the ratio of the population over 65, 
say, to that  20 to  65 that  are of concern; the effect will be strongest with a 
cycle of births of half-wavelength 25 to 30 years. Such a cycle gives first a high 
ratio of those drawing to those contributing, and hence a great burden on the 
latter; then this changes to a low ratio, and corresponding relief of the contri- 
butors, assuming that  the pension per retired person is held constant over 
time, or  else is uniformly rising. Those shorter or longer than two generations 
will give less trouble. 
We know a little about the amplitude of cycles of births, having observed 
those in some countries for up to two centuries. Unfortunately we have only one 
baby boom to go on, but let us take it as providing a n  indication of the range 
that is likely in the future. From the fact that the h g h  in births was 4.3 million 
in the United States in 1961, and the subsequent low in the early 1970s was 
about 3.1 million, we can say that on a mean of 3.7 million births the extreme 
variation would be 600,000 births up and down. In this case the cycle seems to 
be shorter than the 50 to  60 years suggested above as having the maximum 
effect on equity, but we wdl combine the amplitude of the actual baby boom 
with the wave length that would maximize the intergenerational effect. 
To ascertain the relation between cycles in births and cycles in the ratio of 
pensioners to contributors, we suppose constant mortality, and work out an 
ordmary population projection with a sine wave of births having amplitude 1.2 
million and wave-length 60 years. With these inputs we will take as the relevant 
part of the output the ratio of the  population 65 and over to  that  20 to 65. It 
is expected that the output would considerably amplify the input. 
One needs a reserve to buffer such waves as are  generated in this model-- 
and in the reality. Our next question is how big such a reserve must be in 
order to permit a constant charge to individuals along with a constant amount 
of pension. The amount of reserve may be calculated by trial and error. 
Start the iteration with a reserve of 10 per cent of the average annual expendi- 
ture; suppose a suitable rate of interest accumulation, say 5 per cent; suppose 
also that the process starts with a large number of persons drawing, the reserve 
having been built up during the preceding period when there were many contri- 
butors and few drawing. In these circumstances we would find the amount of 
the reserve a t  the bottom of the next cycle or two. If it turns out that the 
reserve is positive at  the bottom, then 10 per cent is larger than necessary; i f  it 
is negative a t  the bottom, then 10 per cent is too small. One could iterate to 
the reserve that would just serve to buffer the amount of fluctuation in births. 
Under this condition we still have a question of equity between the initial 
generation that provides the reserve and the later generations that benefit 
from it without contributing. It would be better to build up the reserve over 
the course of several cycles. With such long waves the rate of interest that can 
be supposed becomes important; we need to experiment with several rates, 
preferably being concerned with the real rate after inflation is allowed for, not 
the nominal rate. 
If the scheme is permitted to borrow in the troughs then a smaller reserve 
will suffice; the condition being only that the average balance over the long term 
be zero. Now no initial reserve would be necessary; one would start accumulat- 
ing or borrowing from a neutral point. Given the history of short-range politi- 
cally influenced decision-making on social security one may question the pru- 
dence of allowing borrowing. 
Elements in Intergenerational Equity 
The fluctuations of pension costs or benefits raises the subject of intergen- 
erational equity, but it is only part of that subject. I t  is well to list the various 
components of equity and see how the pension component fits with them. 
1) Persons currently working pay the pensions of those retired. Since this 
is the subject of the rest of the paper, we need not say more here. Howeve~it 
should not be foregotten that there are other hnds  of transfer that similar 
related to the aged population, and hence can cross generations in the same way 
as pensions. Health insurance, whether private or public, involves heavier pay- 
ments and smaller utilization by those working than by those too old to work; 
insofar as the former are healthier than the latter and current premiums do 
not take full account of this some part of the premium must be considered 
in the intergenerational account. (Though again the matter is radically different 
for a funded and a pay-as-you-go health scheme.) 
2) Persons currently working pay for the schooling of the next generation. 
This goes in the opposite direction to the pensions, and may be regarded as an 
offset. If the two were of the same amount, then equity would be preserved in 
the community as a whole, just as it is in the individual family; father pays for 
the schooling of his children, and in return expects them to keep him in his old 
age. We need more data on the relative costs of schooling and pensions; some 
guesses are made in the section below. 
For a traditional community the relation is clearcut. Individuals are 
identified in the family; the same father who paid for upbringing is the one who 
claims for maintenance later. If there is any place for gratitude in the social 
system it is here, and if there is one virtue that parents take care to instill in 
their children it is a sense of gratitude and respect towards their elders. The 
mast that can be said about the relation in a modern community is that the 
same (more or less undefined) cohort that paid for schooling now claims for 
pensions. The state or local government is the intermediary, and it would be 
too much to expect gratitude for schooling to be funnelled through the 
government and then be transmitted to individual old people 
For any community 'schoolmg' is at  most a part of the cost of the oncom- 
ing generation. What is meant that would fit into the present context is total 
upbringing cost to be compared with total cost for the care of the aged. Unfor- 
tunately for measurement both contain elements that cannot be estimated by 
any method known to statistics. Mother's love may have infinite value, or none 
a t  all, depending on the frame of reference used. 
3) The large generation has an easier time covering the pensions of its 
parents, but on the other hand it has a harder time making a living, if we accept 
the reasoning of Easterlin (1960) and others who make the prosperity of a 
group depend on its being small. We have at  least the possibility that the older 
generation did the younger damage by bearing so many of them, and giving 
them an easier time in paying for the pensions of their parents is but a small 
offset to this. 
4) A crucial element in the exchange is the material investment by which 
the older generation gives the younger a standard of living higher than its 
own. One can imagine a selfish cohort that ran its capital into the ground, 
aiming to leave it at  net value zero by the time it died. Such a cohort would 
have little claim on the one that followed it, and the one that followed would 
have no means to respond to a claim if made, since its income would be only 
what can be produced without initial capital. Of course we now know that 
material capital is not what counts most, but rather human capital, including 
the ability of individuals to work together, to organize themselves effectively, 
and to perform the technical tasks necessary. That throws us back to item 2) 
above, yet material capital is not to be wholly disregarded. 
A cohort that educated its chldren well, and also gave them a generous 
stock of physical capital would have a large claim on them colectively, and 
they would have both the means to look after their aging predecessors and the 
willingness to apply them to this end. Thus after a long argument we come 
back to the means of providing pensions that arises naturally under a competi- 
tive system--i.e. the purchase of actuarially calculated annuities. If such savings 
are invested in capital goods they produce income from whch in due course 
pensions can be paid. We have argued for partial funding on the grounds it 
could even out the costs and benefits of successive generations under the popu- 
lation waves that seem to be part of life in a contracepting society; the quite 
different argument of intergenerational equity leads to the same conclusion. 
Reciprocity between parents and children 
We proceed to examine the commitments that are required for any kind of 
social security scheme to work. In the pay-as-you-go arrangement each genera- 
tion has to acknowledge an obligation to support the preceding generation, with 
no possible quid pro quo. True it has been brought up and sent to school a t  the 
expense of the older geheration, but a t  least in the past t h s  has created an obli- 
gation on an individual rather than on a collective basis. The collective obliga- 
tion to the old must inevitably seem weaker than ancient traditional obligations 
within the family, and yet as time goes along more comes to rest on this obliga- 
tion, especially because of two factors: the greater length of life and the 
increased cost of medical care. 
From a purely cost point of view medical care feeds on itself: better care 
enables people to live longer, and pushing into older ages means more days in 
hospital per year, as well as more expensive treatment while in hospital. Medi- 
cal advance that enables individuals to live longer gives them more opportunity 
to use physicians and hospitals. Let no one think that funds invested in medical 
research will save money later by keeping people well; they do of course help 
keep people well, but that is more than offset financially by people living into a 
time of life when health hazards are greater. 
Some hypothetical data should give an ideal of the cash items entering 
into thc balance between costs of the old and of the young. Schooling informa- 
tion is available for most countries. Putting the matter on a per child basis, it 
might cost $5000 per year to keep a child at school on the average, and length of 
schooling is typically 12 years in industrial countries, making a total of $60,000. 
At the other end of life an old person might live 18 years beyond age 65, and be 
in hospital 6 days per year at a cost of $300 per day, or $1800 per year, making 
a total of $32,400. Aside from this the cost of the pension might be $5000 per 
year for the 18 years, making $90,000 in all. Thus the cash outlay for the old is 
considerably greater than the cash outlay for the education of the young. How 
much one adds for the personal service of the parents to the young is arbitrary. 
At one extreme taking the mother's time at a market price of $10,000 per year 
for 10 years gives $100,000. At the other extreme taking the mother at zero, as 
though she has no market value while raising her children, leaves the cost of 
the child at the relatively moderate amount needed for food, clothing, etc. We 
tend to arrange matters so that the personal care factor, the part that does not 
go through the market, is much greater for the young than for the old. 
Thus we come to the point where without taking account of the time of the 
parents the cost of the old is much greater than the cost of raising the young; 
taking full market price for the time of the parents makes the cost of children 
while they are dependent much greater than the cost of parents when they are 
old. In traditional society the exchange was taken for granted, and no one 
reckoned costs; in modern society more of the cost of the old than of the young 
goes through the market, and costs covered in cash are more visible than 
costs in unpaid family care. 
Corresponding to this is the difference between the two kinds of expendi- 
ture, that one is undertaken individually by parents, the other collectively by 
the community. Couples can decide to have chldren or not, and t h s  free and 
voluntary choice contributes to a sense of responsibility; no one decides 
whether to  have parents, and in a voluntaristic culture the parents not having 
been chosen lessens the sense of responsibility of their children for them. 
The number of chldren that a couple have will in no way influence their 
welfare when old if they are on a complete social security system. That the 
costs of the children are born by the couple, while the cost of the couple when 
old is not to any appreciable degree born by their own children is a clear disin- 
centive to have chldren,  and the low birth rates of industrial countries, all of 
which have collective provision for their aged, may in part be attributed to this 
asymmetry between the maintenance of the young and of the old. 
One would like to be able to gather empirical information on the strength of 
the social security effect on the fertility of parents; perhaps one could use his- 
torical series or cross-sectional data or a combination, plus hypothetical ques- 
tions addressed to a sample of the population. The introduction of social secu- 
rity has been suggested as a means of reducing fertility in the LDCs but the 
method, given the difficulties that it offers in the richest countries, seems 
hardly withn reach of the poor. China is trying a modified form of t h s  in mak- 
ing the income of those too old to work the responsibility of the local brlgade 
or neighborhood, rather than of the family. Some success is reported; how far 
this revolutionary change can be carried remains to be seen. 
Commitment beyond the family 
A funded scheme lessens the amount of commitment required. It 
makes the balance between the generations reciprocal on the transactions 
involved in social security, without the need to bring in the education of the 
young. For a funded scheme the individual buys a pension, say with monthly 
payments deducted from h s  wages. If the price system is stable, and the con- 
tract is adhered to, and the employer or insurance company invests the pay- 
ments productively so that the interest payments reflect added social wealth in 
real terms, then it seems fair to say that the pensioner has paid for h s  own pen- 
sion; more strictly that the cohort has paid for its pension, since we have to 
recognize that individual ages a t  death are a random variable. 
The conditions specified can break down in a number of ways. Some 
employers make a commitment to their employees but do not set aside the 
funds for it; they disregard the first rule of accounting by which the costs of this 
year's production ought to be charged to t h s  year. The firm could be out of 
business by the time its employees retire; it could be in business but taking 
losses. The pension contributions should not only build up a fund, but the fund 
should be held in some outside company, so as to spread the risk to the 
employee. 
The need for commitment is not entirely eliminated by the pension con- 
tract. The annuity policy issued by an insurance company, or the mortgage con- 
tract, if that  has been the instrument in which the savings have been invested, 
could be simply repudiated. The question would be then whether such repudia- 
tion is more or less likely than the repudiation by some generation of its obllga- 
tion to the preceding generation under pay as you go. If the burden keeps 
climbing it would be easy for the legislature to  curtail beneflts immediately to 
relieve the current contributors. On the other hand agreemeht to a 
modification to start  20 or 30 years hence is an action by present payers to 
reduce their own return. 
Downward adjustments to the beneflts to take effect some decades after 
the legislation is passed is more equitable than immediate adjustment of both 
contributions and benefits. Just as the cohort principle embodied in a funded 
scheme puts less strain on the relation between generations so any modification 
will place less strain on the commitment if both benefits and contributions are 
adjusted for a given cohort rather than at  a given moment. 
Up to now the legislature has been making benefits ever more generous. 
Presumably t h s  accords with its perception of the wishes of the community as a 
whole, or a t  least of the majority of its constituents. But imagine the day when 
the constituents focus on costs, as they have up to now focussed on benefits. 
Nothing in law or morality prevents reversal of the trend, with curtailment of 
benefits in order to hold down taxes, Insofar as t h s  takes place at  a given 
moment rather than for a given cohort, it is again unfair and strains the sense 
of commitment; now it is the old whose resentment would be aroused. 
That brings us to the question of how to ensure that such curtailment will 
not occur, or will be as moderate as possible if it is inevitable. My answer is the 
simple one: make the scheme funded a t  least in part. If full funding means the 
holding of six years of contributions in trust, (see the earlier working paper for 
the algebra) then start  by building up one year's contributions in trust, i.e 
start by working towards one-sixth funding. Such a fund could be built up 
either by increasing taxes or buy curtailing benefits with existing taxes. 
This is no proposal for mere manipulation of finances, but concerns the 
creation of a direct quid pro quo by the older generation in return for the sup- 
port that it expects from the younger one. I t  corresponds to the man building a 
house for himself and another for his son whle he is in his working years, on the 
understanding that when he is old he will live in the house he built for himself 
and the son will provide him with. groceries. Every contribution that is made 
along this line will strengthen the solidarity of the generations and head off the 
kind of repudiation of social security that people fear. It may well be that the 
investment of the old in their children is too small to ensure the maintenance of 
the old by the chldren as things now stand, and a funded scheme is a way of 
enabling people to help their children more--by contributing to the capital 
stock-- and so having a more even balance between the generations. 
This argument for a funded scheme has been developed in the earlier 
paper, which also dealt with the the argument raised (for example by 
Bourgeois-Pichat, 1978) against it--that the total fund would be greater than the 
entire wealth of the nation. Aside from the incorrect assumptions in such com- 
parisons of the reserve with the national stock of capital, and even if their 
qumbers were right, no one is discussing funding the whole scheme at  the level 
of people's wages while they are working. All that is under discussion is the 
funding of a part, and initially it would have to be a small part, of the provision 
for old age, in addition to what is done through private pension schemes. 
Of course private schemes would indeed serve the same purpose, and they 
should be encouraged through income tax and other provisions. The U.S. govern- 
ment by indexing guarantees the pensions of its own employees against inflation; 
why should it not do the same for all employees? Some countries ineffect have 
started to just that. 
Apparent fragility causes resistance to any change and resistance 
makes schemes more fragile 
Because the waters have been muddied by successive authoritative state- 
ments that the social security scheme was financially sound, and it turned out 
again and again conspicuously on the edge of bankruptcy, many find it difficult 
to accept reassurances that if some modification is now made the scheme will 
indeed be sound. The attitude has been rather that the scheme is in danger 
of collapse, that people seriously doubt whether they will ever collect their own 
pension from it, and the best hope of maintaining the scheme is to resist any 
modification whatever as long as possible. Any change, however slight, seems 
just the opening wedge that will lead to total dismantling. Ths attitude is 
understandable, but it is hardly conducive to the adaptability so badly needed. 
It could well have the unintended result of making the scheme so intolerably 
expensive that at  some point a generation of workers simply gives up. The 
question is how to persuade the public to a healthier understanding of the rela- 
tion of costs to benefits that would bring about acceptance of changes clearly 
needed if schemes are to be truly permanent. 
A Problem in Social Choice 
a) H o w  Much Social Security? 
A thesis of t h s  paper is that the widely mentioned "Crisis of social secu- 
rity" consists in nothing but the fact that the public was led to expect more 
beneflt from social security than it is capable of providing. 
The political dynamics by whch social security was sold to the Congress and 
the corresponding institutions in other countries involved its liberal sponsors in 
exaggerated promises of what it could provide, and understatements of what 
these benefits would cost. Even those making the technical calculations 
feared that realistic estimates of the long term costs would discourage sup- 
porters of the scheme. The result was to surprise and please the public that 
so much could be obtained for so little. People said "Now I will be relieved of 
the care of my aged parents; they will have their own income a t  the 
government's expense." No one seemed to  note that setting up parents in a 
home of their own was going to cost more than having them live with their chil- 
dren, and that the same children--now collectively--were going to have to cover 
the increased cost. 
When any commodity is underpriced people will buy too much of it. Thnk 






